Changing climates affect human societies differently depending on societal structures, cultural perceptions and their relative vulnerability and resilience. In this study, we explore the complex relationship between climate, conflict and society in nineteenth century Zululand. The paper first reviews current debates surrounding the links between climatic change, societal transformation and the rise of the Zulu Kingdom from the late-eighteenth to early-nineteenth centuries. It then considers new empirical evidence relating to conflict and socio-economic changes at a local scale in Zululand from the early-mid-nineteenth century onwards, using a combination of unpublished archival materials written by missionaries and other observers, together with oral histories and traditions. Our analysis highlights how changing precipitation patterns, especially towards drier conditions, may have contributed to changes in societal responses, including dominant narratives about rain-control, the migration and dissolution of society, and conflicts and unrest. We suggest that temporal differences in these responses were contingent upon the role of leaders, power structures, and the willingness and ability of leaders to yield this power. The case of nineteenth century Zululand exemplifies the complexity of environment-society interactions, and strengthens the call for a thorough scrutiny of the narratives of social unrest in specific socio-cultural contexts.
emphasis on complexity is important, and historical examples must be treated with caution to avoid simple cause-effect relationships with respect to the societal effects of predicted environmental scenarios. According to Butzer, the issue is not whether climatic change is relevant for socio-historical change, but how we can deal more objectively with coupled systems that include a great tapestry of variables, among which climatically triggered environmental change is The remainder of the paper is divided into four main sections. After a summary of historical sources and methods, we review debates surrounding the relationship between climate variability and the formation of the Zulu Kingdom -the polity of primary interest in this article -in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, drawing mainly upon previously published material. We then consider new empirical evidence relating to conflict, socio-economic changes and responses to rainfall extremes in Zululand from the early-mid-nineteenth century onwards; this is mostly derived from unpublished archival material written by missionaries and other pre-colonial and colonial observers, and to a lesser extent, oral histories and traditions. Our focus in this section is on small-scale, internal conflicts and unrest within the Zulu Kingdom, as opposed to larger scale external wars (e.g. with the British, Voortrekkers or Swazi), since the latter often have wider political-economic explanations strongly linked to colonial expansion and/or control. By focusing on local, internal conflicts in relation to century with the rise of amabutho-based polities, and this eventually grew into full-scale conflict to accumulate more grazing land, as well as cattle itself. 12
In addition to changes in social organisation, a prime explanation for societal transformation in the Zululand area is responses to climatic change and extremes. Hall was the first to hypothesise that trends towards increased rainfall in Zululand from the mid-eighteenth century -towards the end of the Little Ice Age -contributed to an increase in agricultural productivity, and subsequently population density, as recorded in early traveller's writings and archaeological evidence. Furthermore, Hall, Hedges, Maggs, Huffman, and Holmgren and Öberg, all argue that the adoption of maize as a staple crop at this time of increased rainfall aided population growth, as maize has higher yields relative to the formerly dominant staples of sorghum and millet. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, however, a rapid decline in annual rainfall culminated in severe, multi-year droughts, which led to what became known as the 'mahlatule famine' -remembered in oral traditions as the time 'we were obliged to eat grass' -at the turn of the nineteenth century, and a later protracted drought during the 1820s. 13 Hannaford et al. note that as these droughts impacted upon transformed vulnerability contexts, the severity of their impacts was likely to have been unprecedented. In particular, increased dependence on maize, which is more sensitive to water-deprivation than sorghum, together with a growing population, meant that local subsistence agriculture was more vulnerable than in previous droughts. Food shortages were, therefore, reached at an earlier stage of a prolonged drought, forcing a reliance on wild food resources (see Hannaford and Nash for a discussion). Kingdom. According to Deflem, Shaka enhanced the amabutho system and disciplined the army from the ideas of Dingiswayo, and both military innovations and diplomatic intervention allowed Shaka to expand his influence over much of the area between the Pongola and Tugela rivers (Figure 1 ). The Zulu Kingdom was highly stratified, with homesteads spread over hills and ridges all over the country, forming the basic production units. The King exercised authority over these homesteads, extracting surplus from them, and uniting them administratively into one large centralised political entity. All men reaching the age of puberty now had to serve in the Zulu army, and were gathered into age-sets. Guy notes that each man still had to derive his subsistence from his own labour but was also dependent on supplies from their 'father' homesteads. 17
Rainmaking and ritual power (1818-1835)
As the Zulu kingdom grew, an important step taken by Shaka was to violently neutralise the powers of Zulu sorcerers, medicine-men and rainmakers (or inyangas). Hamilton and Deflem hold that, in this way, the King gained monopoly over supernatural practices, thereby extending his authority and strengthening his position as a link to ancestral spirits. By expelling all rainmakers from his kingdom, Shaka made it clear that only he could control the heavens. According to Gluckman, the religious and supernatural duties of the king were vested in the office of the kingship, so that the king's successor took over these duties. However, Shamase notes that, during Shaka's reign, loyalty was to the King as a person, not to the monarchy itself, while for later
Kings the loyalty was to the institution of the monarchy. 18
Hovland and Parrinder note that the King's ritual role in producing rain was held to be an important part of the powerbase in the Zulu Kingdom, and can be traced back to efforts made by Shaka to embody these powerful institutions under the King's domain.
According to Weir, Shaka enhanced his power by calling on ancestors through dreams, to acquire powerful medicines and to make rain. When subordinating neighbours, Shaka also annexed the medicine and rainmaking skills of the defeated groups. In doing so, he Kelso and Vogel, and Nash and Grab, the most severe of these dry spells was the drought Table 2 . Drought episodes and wetter periods in former Natal and Zululand between 1836 and 1900, identified from historical sources.
Climatic condition Rainy seasons affected
Severe or multi-year dry periods 1836-38, 1861-63, 1865-66, 1868-70, 1876-79, 1883-85, 1886-90, 1895-1900 Severe or multi-year wet There are very many more reports of unrest in the historical documentary records from these years as compared with normal or wet periods. The most common form of unrest, reported by both British and Norwegian missionaries and James Stuart's interviewees, is linked to local beliefs about rain control. In the archives, we find many descriptions of how people were accused of 'nailing the ground' -usually by driving either wooden pegs or metal nails into hill-tops -to prevent rain, thunder or lightning. There are several suggestions that the 'Natal kafirs' 25 or 'outsiders' were responsible for this activity, but local Zulus were also blamed and killed. The evidence of Bikwayo and James Stuart's interpreter, Ndukwana, also attributes nailing the ground to 'outsiders':
The medicine pegs were driven into the ground by outsiders. In time of drought all the inmates of a kraal would go out and hunt in the fields and on the hills for pegs driven in by strangers. Anything found would be taken and thrown into a river or stream. Pegs will be driven all about the kraal. 27 A similar report is given by the Norwegian missionary, Rev. Oftebro of the Eshowe mission station:
It has been terrible to hear the Zulus tell about the kaffirs from Natal that has been arrested and molested because they have been suspected of, and partly admitted to, putting nails in the ground in order to prevent rainfall. It's been very dry, but after the kaffirs were taken it has started to rain. This gives the Zulus strength in their superstition. 28 The Norwegian missionary, Rev. Wettergreen, of the Entumeni mission, provides further details of the method through which rain was supposedly withheld:
The Zulus have the belief that their rain doctors by the help of their sorcery can make rain. Thus the King last year sent for a doctor from Natal by the 26 USPG E13, Mr. Jones, Inkandhla, 1 Dec. 1862 name of Umbete. Umbete arrived and started to grind rain; but before the fruits of Umbete's work could be seen, there were sent for another doctor, by the name of Jonas, who also arrived. This insulted Umbete, who swore that the Zulus should have to pay. As a revenge, and as it is said, also affected by Umunase, the Natal living mother of the fallen prince Umbulazi, has Umbete sent some Natalkaffirs over to Zululand with 'izikonkwane'; nails or wooden pegs, that are thumped into the ground to prevent rain. These pegs are smudged with a dough of flour, wrapped in sugarcane leaves, then some black powder is put on top, and on top of that again some red substance; the red is supposed to symbolise that the heaven will become hard and red, so that no rain will fall. It is easy to understand that the Zulus believe as much in this effect as in rainmaking, and that they punish the ones that practise such evil. 29
Rev. Wettergreen also notes that the situation posed great restriction on movement for the indigenous population:
There was a command that all Natalkaffirs, that walked alone without the company of a white man, should be tied. As a result many Natalkaffirs were tied up and robbed, some killed, though not only due to this reason, but it was not in the command from the prince that they should be killed ... The enormous impact this has on the connection between the mission stations must be understood. People that are in our labour do not dare to walk alone with a letter or a package, without the company of a white man, and that counts for both Zulus and Natalkaffirs. When they carry a package or a letter they are often seen as being in the service of a white man, but in places where they are not well known, they are taken for amakafula; Natalkaffirs; and are naturally put under the same torture as they are; it does not help to say where they come from or where they are going, in a country where all people are liars. We cannot ask our people to run errands when we know that they can get tied up. 30 The drought of 1861-63 was followed by two relatively wet years, during which there is no mention of social unrest and conflict in our material. 1865-66, and with it several accounts of conflict related to the suspected nailing of the ground. For example, Rev. Schreuder of the Entumeni mission reports:
The summer rain has now started. This year we have also had 'heavennailing' upheavals in the country due to long duration drought. This year has been very bloody. The inhabitants of nine farmsteads have been massacred.
We have now had one week of splendid rain, so we started to hope for better times regarding these nailing-incidents, but as long as nailing-lies are about it is not easy to send our natives around the country. 31
Two months later, Rev. Larsen of the Inhlasatye mission notes:
In October we only had 4 small showers. Quite insufficient to soften the hard ground. Calling a rainmaker from the colony did not help. Not until November did he have success (rain arrived). Thus, we had the same nailing-incident as a few years back. But not in the lowland, where it rained well. Several people were killed because they were accused of nailing the ground to prevent rain. 32 A similar pattern is reported during the relatively dry rainy season of 1871-72, when the Norwegian missionary priest Rev. Gundersen writes that the Zulus have killed a rain-doctor by 'tying him to a log and throwing him into the river Tugela, where he was eaten by greedy crocodiles'. Gundersen further notes that 1871-72 was a particularly violent year, during which an executioner was sent to four farmsteads, with several people killed at each locality 33 . In addition to the murders and molestations, we can also read from the letters that Zulus banned from travelling during droughts, unless in the presence of a white person. If travelling alone they risked accusations of being 'NatalKaffirs' with intentions of 'nailing the ground'. There is evidence, however, of the ban being ignored in some parts of the country, as Robertson of KwaMagwaza reports: The preceding empirical evidence suggests that unrest and widespread killings were indirectly linked to droughts, primarily through accusations of rain control related to the local belief of 'nailing the ground'. To our knowledge, no previous studies have documented the function and origin of this practice. However, Berglund's book, Zulu
Thought-patterns and Symbolism, includes a description of a similar practice whereby sharp sticks, protruding stones and boulders lying on hills are perceived to hinder rain.
Berglund notes, 'When there is a drought, people are sent to remove all upright and protruding sticks and stones, especially on elevated hills and mountains'. According to popular belief, this is because they resemble spears pointing at the heavens, which is a sign of disrespect to the 'Lord-of-the-sky'. The sticks and stones are also suggested to cause fear in the sky, making it afraid to release rain. 35
1872-1900: Narratives of migration and dispersal
Although it is difficult to pinpoint the precise timing, references to local unrest related to accusations of 'nailing the ground' appear to stop after the 1871-72 dry period. Rev. Dahle reports from Empangeni that people were migrating from the lowlands to the highlands where the drought had been less severe:
As a consequence of the lack of rain this summer both the kassa and amatabele harvest here in the lowland failed. Many people are moving to the highlands where the drought has been less severe, where they stay with relatives and friends, others are moving to Natal to seek employment, while the ones that stay behind must look after the farms and cattle. 37
The British missionary, J.M. Samuelsson, reports similar observations:
The congregations have been rather small owing to the fact that very many of the people had to leave their homes in search of food in other parts of the country. 38
Reports during the multi-year drought of 1883-85 include descriptions of people being too hungry to fight. Rev. Oftebro, for example, notes:
For the time being it is quiet everywhere due to hunger, but the general opinion is that as soon as people have enough food there will be war again. 39 The final dry period for which significant documentation is available is the multi-year drought of 1895-1900. During this protracted drought, the onset of which is potentially girls -were walking to the coast to buy or get some potatoes from their relatives.
Then a revolution occurred, a radical process of dispersal among the people:
quite a few went to Natal and Johannesburg to find work in order to make an income for their homes; others scattered around the country, partly to beg, partly to find temporary shelter to relatives or acquaintances. Most homes contained only few people. They were always on the move to somewhere where a little food could be obtained, higher places were a bit better off, while lower parts of the country were very crowded. 41 The American missionary, Rev. Ransom, further notes:
Migrations -140b-7, Rev. Braatvedt, 8 Dec. 1896; MHS, Mission Archives, A1045-140b-8, Rev. Steenberg, 15 Aug. 1896 In summary, over the last three decades of the nineteenth century there was a shift in the nature of the response of Zulu populations to single-or multi-year drought episodes.
Unrest and violence associated with accusations of rain control were replaced, at some point during the early-mid-1870s, by population dispersal, culminating in large scale migration at the close of the century. It is very likely that this came as a result of the imposition of British colonial administration.
DISCUSSION
Viewing the preceding accounts of drought responses in the light of known political and social changes in Zululand during the nineteenth century, an interesting narrative emerges. With the caveats that (i) the available historical reports are relatively limited, and (ii) the majority of accounts are seen through the eyes of outsiders, it is possible to draw some generalisations concerning climatic events and social unrest. There is no doubt that weather, and especially periods of excess rainfall/drought, had a major impact upon local subsistence economies in southeastern Africa. Hence, weather also played a major role in Zulu social and political organisation, control regimes and cultural beliefs. During the early-nineteenth century, there are well-documented accounts of mass migration, population dispersal and socio-political transformation. This was a function of multiple factors, both environmental and societal. The droughts of the earlynineteenth century had a major impact on society, due, at least in part, to a progressive dependence on maize and heightened inequality within and between chiefdoms.
Increasing political centralisation in the rule of Dingiswayo and Shaka also entailed more tightly enforced laws and military customs.
As noted earlier, from the mid-1820s up until the Anglo-Zulu war in 1879, King Shaka and his successors made great efforts to gain monopoly over rainmaking, medicine and ritual practices, which resulted in the killing and expulsion of traditional rain-doctors.
By embodying these powerful institutions, the King strengthened and centralised his powerbase and also gained greater coercive control over newly subordinate groups. He also placed the kingdom at the centre of the supernatural realm and positioned the King in a direct line to divine powers. This was, however, a perilous position, since the King risked rebellion if he did not deliver rain, as reported elsewhere in southeast Africa by Huffman. Thus, to secure power in times of hardship, including droughts, blame was transferred from the royal seat to external powers or 'outsiders', such as the 'Natal-Kaffirs' or local disobedient individuals, who were accused of being sorcerers and were thus brutally killed. The myth of the impacts of 'nailing the ground', similar to other features of Zulu mythology, was actively engaged to divert peoples' frustrations. In this way, the King managed to both give an explanation as to why he no longer controlled the skies to the benefit of his people, but also to generate fear of questioning the authority of the Kingdom. It is, of course, possible to interpret the act of 'nailing the ground' as representing one facet of the conflict between the Zulu Kingdom and, for instance, royal heirs that took refuge in Natal (as described by Rev. Wettergreen above). The employment of such 'supernatural warfare' by rival groups would have been perceived
by Zulu powers as a real threat, and provided a strong incentive for the use of brutal force against apparent (and real) enemies of the state. 44 Another noteworthy aspect reported by missionaries in the mid-nineteenth century is that people were prohibited to travel during droughts, unless in the presence of a white person, because they then could be accused of being 'Natal-Kaffirs' with intentions of 'nailing the ground' or regarded as accomplices to such crimes. Although this ban was not recognised in all parts of Zululand, it had the effect of constraining potential rebellion against the king for failing to deliver rain. In addition, population dispersals and mass migrations -previously common responses to those worst affected by and least able to cope with droughts -were effectively hindered through the ban on travel.
A further striking feature from the historical record is that the accounts of accusations of 'nailing the ground' apparently end around the death of Mpande. After the Anglo-Zulu war, and the subsequent annexation of Zululand by the British, we find no report of such accusations, nor any references to explanations for drought associated with this practice. This strengthens the suggestion that such accusations were used for political gain, and to secure the power of the King in times of distress. Following the establishment of indirect British rule, the power balance in Zululand was disrupted and the Zulu Kingdom lost its aura of invincibility and divinity. The implications of this power-shift are most striking in the descriptions of the protracted droughts towards the end of the nineteenth century. Instead of reports of rain control, which might be expected based on material from the mid-100s, there are no such references from this period. Rather, we find narratives of the mass dispersal of people, described as a revolution by missionaries, including both local movements from the coast to inland areas, and also longer migrations to urban centres and other parts of the country. This mirrors the way in which populations reacted to large-scale subsistence crises prior to the establishment of the Zulu Kingdom. Seen through this lens, we view the killings, molestations and incidents of local unrest reported during droughts in the times of the sovereign Zulu Kingdom as a coercive means of controlling people and maintaining authority. This interpretation offers an explanation for the reports of heightened conflict, unrest and murder related to drought years that we have found in historical and oral sources, which contrast markedly with contemporary research into climate-unrest relations in Africa such as that reported by Adano et al. and Butler and Gates. 45 CLIMATE AND CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY ZULULAND: SOME CONCLUSIONS At the beginning of this paper we questioned how conflict and climate coincide, and whether there is support for the hypothesis that extreme or anomalous weather leads to greater unrest. We have addressed these issues through primary examination of the historical case of later-nineteenth century Zululand. In our historical records there is an overrepresentation of reports of local conflict, killings and unrest in many dry or drought years. However, since some very dry periods are associated with violence (most notably those during the early-and mid-nineteenth century), whilst those of the latter nineteenth century are not, it is necessary to look more closely at the contextual sociopolitical framing of these conflicts. In line with Butzer, we find that the potential for conflict, unrest and violence during or after extreme weather events is strongly related to the roles of leaders, elites and ideologies. 46 Although droughts might be associated with periods of violence and unrest, as occurred during the 1860s under the rule of Mpande, they may also be associated with mass migration and the transformation of socio-political structures, as occurred in the earlynineteenth century and under British rule at the end of the century. These outcomes are contingent upon the role of leaders and local power structures, and the willingness and ability of leaders to yield this power. It must also be noted that these droughts occur 45 Warrio Adano et al., 'Climate change, violent conflict and local institutions in Kenya's drylands'; Christopher Butler and Scott Gates, 'African range wars: Climate, conflict and property rights'.
under variable demographic and agricultural conditions; in particular, higher populations and concentrations of both people and livestock were present in the region during the 1890s compared to the 1860s. In addition, and as Ballard describes, the 1890s witnessed the combination of multiple stresses in the form of drought, cattle plague and locust outbreaks. This may, when juxtaposed with the lack of the political control-mechanisms earlier employed by the independent Zulu Kingdom, and the new colonial British policy that, according to McClendon, encouraged migration, have amplified the dispersal process. Overall, the case of nineteenth century Zululand illustrates the complexity of interactions between climate, society and culture, and, echoing authors such as Gleditsch and Gemenne et al., strengthens the need for a thorough scrutiny of the narratives of unrest and conflict in specific socio-cultural contexts. 47 
